UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy
Law
Volume 11
Issue 1 Computer/Law Journal - Winter 1991

Article 7

Winter 1991

An Economic Analysis of Computer Software Copyright: A Welfare
Model of Intellectual Property Rights, 11 Computer L.J. 173
(1991)
Barron Yanaga

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Internet Law Commons,
Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Barron Yanaga, An Economic Analysis of Computer Software Copyright: A Welfare Model of Intellectual
Property Rights, 11 Computer L.J. 173 (1991)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/jitpl/vol11/iss1/7
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law by an authorized
administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

NOTE
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT:
A WELFARE MODEL OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Computer software defies the traditional categorizations of intellectual property media. At times it is a scientific innovation. At other
times, often at the same time, software is a creative work of expression.
More important, the advancements in computer art, computerized/digitized music, and other multi-media areas will muddle those distinctions
even more.
It is no wonder that courts have struggled to develop this area of
the law. Analogy-based arguments are only useful if we have good analogies. In essence, courts are driving forward while looking in the rearview mirror. The historical perspective (the rear-view mirror) is most
useful if we are traveling on a familiar street. If we are traveling in unchartered territory, a rear-view mirror is less useful.
This is not to say that we cannot find our way using the rear-view
mirror. We can, by trial and error, chart a new map of the unexplored
territory. The courts have done this for the past thirty years. Unfortunately, technology is advancing far faster than the courts, and we face
the prospect that new doctrines may be obsolete before they are fully
developed.
This Note analyzes the extent to which computer software should
be afforded copyright protection. The issue is addressed from a prospective point-of-view, unbound by legal precedent. It does not ignore history, but keeps it in perspective. The approach this Note takes is
different from previous papers. Most legal papers argue that existing
doctrines (developed by various courts) are either proper or improper.
For the most part, this paper ignores these doctrines until the theory
and model are developed. Only then does this paper discuss whether
existing doctrines match the developed theory and model. On the other
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hand, most economic papers argue whether the existing statutes are optimal (e.g., optimal patent life). This Note takes the statute as given.
Instead it looks at the other aspect of our common law legal system, the
actions taken by judges. Hence, this paper is concerned with defining
the optimal behavior of judges (as opposed to legislators).
Section II addresses the basic question of why intellectual property
should receive protection at all. At first glance, the answer is obvious"[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts. .

. ."'

However,

this answer presupposes a more basic question-why do we need to promote the useful arts and sciences? Section II discusses the failure of
traditional arguments to satisfactorily explain the need to protect intellectual property, and Section III discusses the economic theories behind
intellectual property protection.
After the normative framework is complete, a theory must be developed on how to reach our normative objective. That is, how should
we accomplish our goal and what factors have an impact on our objective? Section IV discusses the different modes of achieving this goal.
Section V discusses the appropriate breadth of protection from an economic standpoint, and Section VI attempts to point out the major factors that impact our analysis.
Once the theoretical framework is developed, Section VII attempts
to develop a workable model which policymakers and judges can use.
Since we have limited human capacities, we need to develop a model
that will help us decide a proper course-of-action, based on limited information. Section VIII compares the legal doctrine to the developed
model.
Section IX points out that the international dimensions of copyright
need to be considered, and therefore warrant further discussion.
II. WHY HAVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION?
The Constitution specifically gives Congress the power to pass laws
.to promote the progress of science and the useful arts .... ,,2
Therefore, the law should protect computer software as long as such
protection promotes the useful arts and science. However, as stated
above, there is a deeper question of why we need to specially protect
this type of activity. Analyzing this question may reveal a deeper normative goal. This section concludes that traditional views have not adequately addressed the question of the breadth of rights and that
economic views may have a better explanation.
1. U.s.
2. Id.

CONST. art.

I, § 8, c. 8.
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A.

TRADITIONAL VIEWS

Most of the legal literature treats intellectual property rights in the
same way as it treats other property rights.3 Property rights are seen
from the perspective of the moral rights of the individual.
1.

Labor Theory

Generally, labor theory tells us that the inventor or author should
receive the fruits of his work.4 In a sense, this paper presumes that this
right exists (e.g., in litigation, someone has a patent or copyright). Conversely, labor theory does not clearly offer a way to determine the
breadth of this right (e.g., how broad is the patent or copyright
5
protection).
Moreover, this theory does not explain why work product from authors and inventors is different from other types of labor.6 Even if we
presume that there is something different about creators, it is not clear
that the mere expense of labor is a good reason to award intellectual
property rights.7
2.

Personality Theory

Personality theory tells us that property rights exist because the
creation is an expression of the creator.8 Therefore, a violation of the
property is like a violation of the person. Again, this paper presumes
that there is a general right; the question is how broad the right should
be.9 In addition, as with labor theory, personality theory may not explain why there is a need for a separate system of protection for this
type of property. 10
3. For a discussion of traditional arguments see Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
4. See generally id. at 296-330. Hughes outlines a basic labor theory argument.
5. See generally Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright. A Study of Copyright in
Books Photocopies, and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284-91 (1970). Breyer
argues that traditional arguments for intellectual property are not very strong.
6. See generally id. at 285-86. Breyer questions whether traditional views can explain why intellectual property cannot be protected through general means, i.e., property
law, contract law, tort, etc.
7. See generally id. at 288-89 and n.29. Breyer asks the question "Why?" in reference to the Lockean view. Breyer argues that with conventional property there is a congestion problem, i.e., only one person can have the property at a time. This is not
necessary with intellectual property.
8. See generally Hughes, supra note 3, at 330-66. Hughes outlines a basic personality
theory argument.
9. See generally Breyer, supra note 5, at 284-91. Breyer argues that traditional arguments do not present a convincing argument for intellectual property.
10. See generally id. at 289-91. Breyer argues that the traditional views have not
presented a convincing argument for why a separate system is required.
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Personality theory may help answer another question-what are a
creator's "moral" rights (e.g., even after selling some of the rights,
should the creator's name be on any publication?). However, the question of moral rights is beyond the scope of this paper."
3. Summary
While traditional views can tell us when a grant of rights should
exist, they do not directly address the question of how broad these
I2
rights should be.

B. ECONOMIC VIEW
An economic perspective (possibly a liberal economic perspective)
is from the society as a whole, rather than from the specific moral
rights of the individual. Generally, the economic view proposes that the
government does not protect property rights merely to protect individual moral rights. Instead, the government protects property rights to
maximize the welfare of society as a whole. The government should reward the individual creator with the rights which maximize social
3
welfare.'
Therefore, economics provides a theoretical framework to answer
the two questions that the labor theory and personality theory could
not:
(1) Does intellectual property warrant special protection? Yes, if
protection maximizes social welfare.
(2) How broad should protection be? Broad enough to maximize
social welfare.
III.

AN ECONOMIC VIEW: WHY HAVE PROTECTION AT ALL?

From an economic standpoint, the only reason to intervene 14 in the
market is to correct a market failure. The justification most often cited
is the public goods (positive externalities) problem.15 Generally, the
producer of the good has no way to exclude others from enjoying the
benefits of his production and has no effective way of charging others
11. This paper focuses on the economic rights, i.e., the ability to exact financial
rewards.

12. An in-depth argument is beyond the scope of this paper. For a more detailed discussion, see Hughes, supra note 3 and Breyer, supra note 5.
13. This is, of course, a simplification. It views the individuals in government as
working in the interest of all of society rather than working in their own self-interest.
14. "Intervene" is meant to mean any economic regulatory process. It does not neces-

sarily refer to any political inferences.
15. See, e.g., Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of CopyrightProtectionfor Application
Progrums, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1058-66 (1989); W. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND

WELFARE 35-59 (1969).
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for the use. Since the producer faces all the cost and only a small portion of the benefit, he will tend to underproduce the good.
With software, if everyone could copy a creator's product (presumably at a low cost), very few people would buy the original. Just as in
the public goods case, the creator has faced the entire burden of production but has received only a small portion of the benefit (from the few
originals that sold). Therefore, the creator will tend to underproduce.
A slightly more sophisticated explanation is that the creator faces
both fixed and variable costs, while a challenger only faces variable
costs. At competitive prices, where price equals the low average costs of
competitors, the creator will have to price below his cost and therefore
lose money.
With other economic activities, this bidding process is important
since only the efficient producers will stay in business. The market will
bid out inefficient producers. This generally means that consumers receive more goods at a lower price (in a purely competitive model) and
hence, the economy as a whole is better off. However, with intellectual
property, if the creator does not produce, obviously no one else will be
able to copy. While the economy gains by the elimination of inefficient
producers, it also loses the entire benefit of production.
If the gross benefit from an innovation (including positive externalities) is larger than the total costs, the economy is better off if the creator produces. Since, as stated above, the individual agent has a
disincentive to produce (the market failure), society must subsidize the
creator to overcome this disincentive (assuming society's goal is to maximize aggregate welfare). Copyright protection is one type of subsidy. It
allows the holder to exact monopoly rents, thereby increasing the creator's incentive to innovate (or lessening the disincentive to innovate).
IV.

WHAT FORM SHOULD THE SUBSIDY TAKE?

There is more than one way to give innovators incentives to innovate. Moreover, at present, the government uses more than one method
to provide incentives, the most important probably being direct research
16
grants.
While the issue of form is not directly related to how broad the
grant should be, it is useful in determining how to reconcile practice
with theory. In other words, our use of a copyright (or patent) system
is the root cause of some of the difficulties of reconciling theory and
practice. For example, if our goal is to give the innovator a reward (presumably financial), the government could merely give the innovator an
16. For a discussion of some of these alternatives and their economic impact see
Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives Patents, Prizes and Research Contracts,
73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983).
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ex post reward. 17 This way, there is no underproduction, since the innovator has an incentive to produce. Moreover, since the government
(after quasi-purchasing the copyright or patent) can now release the
technology for public use; the use of the technology is maximized.
There may be an argument that research grants are a form of ex
ante payment. However, ex post rewards are not widely used, with the
possible exception of technology directly consumed by the government.
The reason for this is obvious. How is the government to determine
these values? First, it would be difficult for anyone (including economists) to precisely measure the future value of an innovation (although
it can be estimated). Second, it is even less likely a government body
that is unfamiliar with economics, finance, the market for the product,
and the technology involved will be able to accurately place a value on
the technology.' 8 Third, it is unlikely that this government body will
have an incentive to accurately value these innovations, since politician's personal incentives lie elsewhere. 19
We have therefore settled on a system of granting monopoly rights.
This way, by selecting what to produce and consume, producers and
consumers can determine the value of the product. Even though this
does not theoretically maximize social welfare, this may be the most efficient manner possible. In other words, this mechanism maximizes
welfare when compared to other social mechanisms.
This monopoly, however, causes distortions that make policy decisionmaking difficult. The general consequence of monopoly power is
that the producer will limit the quantity produced and thus raise the
price. This creates a paradox-there is more technology for society, but
fewer members of society can use the new technology (since it is monopolized by the producer). This problem is called the problem of
"underutilization."
The problem with copyright protection is finding a balance between
underproduction and underutilization.20 In other words, we need to
weigh the benefits of more technology versus the loss from less users
having access to the technology (since access is legally restricted). This
issue is discussed in-depth in Section VI.
17. I.e., the government would pay the innovator for the value of the innovation after

the innovation is complete.
18. Although this is somewhat circular, if the court says it is worth a certain amount
and enforces that value, then innovators will only place that value on the innovation.
However, the main point is that innovators, have an asymmetrical information advantage.
See Wright, supra note 16.
19. For example, a legislator's incentive may be to lobby for a constituent rather than
society-at-large.
20. A number of papers have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Novos & Waldman, The
Effects of Increase Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach, 92 J. POL. EcoN. 326
(1984); Johnson, The Economics of Copying, 93 J. POL ECON. 158 (1985).
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V. AN ECONOMIC THEORY: HOW BROAD SHOULD
PROTECTION BE?

The granting of a copyright can have three possible effects on social
welfare: it can increase social welfare, decrease social welfare, or leave
social welfare relatively unchanged. Thus, in theory, the decision
whether to grant a copyright is simple. If we were to line these cases in
order of the net benefit to society, we would award rights to those creators that have innovations with a societal benefit greater than zero.
This way we maximize social welfare.
Unfortunately, as with traditional arguments, this only tells us if
the grant should be made. It does not address the primary question of
how broad the protection should be.
To answer this question, we must consider the individual incentives. We want to give the innovator the incentive to invest in all
projects with a positive net societal benefit. Therefore, we want the innovator to invest in a project up to the point where the marginal value
to society is equal to the marginal cost to society. If we underreward,
the innovator will underinvest and some projects with positive net benefits to society will not be completed. Conversely, if we overreward, the
innovator will overinvest and some projects with negative net benefits
to society will be produced, and resources will be wasted.
The goal of software copyright law, therefore, is to award the innovator a right that is equal to the software's marginal value to society.
21
This way, the innovator has the incentive to optimize social welfare.
One problem with this normative theory arises when the individual
benefit is so large (and therefore the societal benefit is so large) that
the innovator would have completed the project even without protection (and the costs associated with it).22 Our theory would give the innovator a strong grant even though it would be unnecessary.
A simple assumption can eliminate this paradox - the existence of
competition for these grants. 23 A large "abnormal" return24 will attract
21. Note that this is not true with grants. Investment is directed by the government,
which may not be efficient. See Wright, supra note 16, at 691.
22. Basically, demand would out poll supply by a significant enough margin that the
market price remains high enough for the innovation to make an economic profit.
23. See generally, Kamien & Schwartz, Patent Life and R&D Rivalry, 64 AM. ECON.
REV. 183 (1974); DeBrock, Market Structure, Innovation, and Optimal Patent Life, 28 J.
L. & ECON. 223 (1985). Both articles present the concept of competition for innovation.
24. An abnormal return is a return that is consistently (as opposed to randomly)
above or below a normal rate of return. A normal return is a "fair" rate of return. The
term "fair" does not have any legal or philosophical connotation. Instead it refers to the
rate of return necessary for the investor to keep his investment in place (considering the
risk of the project).
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other innovators who would compete away the "abnormal" return. 25
For example, this competition can be the result of: (1) price competition
with final products; (2) competition over the cost of resources such as
scientists, laboratories, etc.; or (3) competition over the costs associated
with obtaining and protecting the grant, such as lawyers' fees. Hence,
the existence of competition tends to bid away this problem. 26
Copyright protection should be broad enough for the producer to
recover the net value created. In a perfect world, this might be the
market value. Unfortunately, the market value (i.e., the price at which
you could sell the copyright) is dependent on how broad a protection
the copyright is awarded by the courts. This creates a circularity problem. Therefore, the courts must develop some way to measure a copyright's value that is independent of the court's decision.
VI.

AN APPROACH TO THE VALUE OF A COPYRIGHT
A.

THE IMPACT OF THE INNOVATION (MAGNITUDE)

As stated above, the question is how to place a societal value on an
innovation. The most obvious first criterion is how much impact the innovation will have on society (or has had, since courts have the advantage of hindsight). Is the innovation of use to a wide variety of people
or only a few? Do these users value the product highly or very little?
These questions are an attempt to find an approximate price and quantity of the innovation. In this case, price refers to the breadth of the
protection, i.e., the ability to maximize the financial rewards. 27 The
broader the protection the higher the price.
Once this approximation is made, we realize that this is only a
rough estimate. The question then becomes whether it is better to err
high or low? This brings us back to the problem of underproduction
versus underutilization.
B.

UNDERPRODUCTION V. UNDERUTILIZATION

As stated above, the problem of underproduction is that the innovator will underproduce if not given enough incentive. Therefore, society
as a whole is worse off.
On the other hand, the award of a monopoly right over the innovation creates other problems. The creator has an incentive to restrict
25. See DeBrock, supra note 23, at 241.
26. Again, this may not occur with grants. Profitability is dependent on government
action. See generally Wright, supra note 16, at 691.
27. In most industries the decision to produce is dependent on the economic value the
producer will receive, i.e., the price. Similarly, the innovator's decision to produce is dependent on the ability to exact economic value. Here, the behavioral function is the same
as price in a general model.
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supply and charge a higher price. In addition, to a certain degree, the
monopoly right restricts the free flow of information which may lead to
later advancements.
Both of these problems are costs of
underutilization.
The most difficult question with regard to copyright (or patent),
therefore, is how to balance the problem of underproduction with the
problem of underutilization.
In economic terms, the most important issue is the relative relationship of the elasticities of supply and demand. In other words, if the
supply of innovation is fixed, increasing or decreasing protection will
have no impact on supply (i.e., no underproduction).ss Conversely, if
demand is fixed, a change in protection will have no impact on demand
(i.e., no underutilization). 9 Of course, supply and demand are usually
neither fixed nor totally elastic. Therefore, the relative relationship of
the elasticities will determine whether the relative cost of underproduction or underutilization is greater.
Ceteris paribus, it would be better to err towards strong protection
when the supply is relatively elastic and the demand is relatively inelastic. Conversely, it would be better to err towards less protection when
the supply is relatively inelastic and demand is relatively elastic.
1.

Demand

The primary factor affecting demand (for our purposes) is the availability of substitutes (competition).
a. Direct Competition
While the above arguments have implicitly assumed a true monopoly, in reality, most software is in a market of monopolistic competition.
That is, while the producer has a monopoly over his product, there may
be substantially similar (but different) products competing for the same
market. 3° If this is the case, demand is more elastic. This monopolistic
3
competition therefore acts as a mitigator against underutilization. '
Hence, the greater the availability of substitute products, the better
it is to err on the side of the producer. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the
copyright protection should be broader.
28. In other words, if supply is fixed, the producer will not change the quantity produced if the price is less.
29. Similarly, if demand is fixed, the quantity concerned is unaltered by a change in
price.
30. Unfortunately, this argument is circular. How substantially similar a competing
product is depends on the degree of protection given by the courts.
31. Forced to lower prices in order to compete, the producer must raise production to
be profitable.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XI

b. Copies as Substitutes
The market for copies also acts as a type of competition. If prices
are high enough to overcome the cost of copying and the loss of quality, 32 consumers will tend to opt for copies instead of originals. 33 This
also acts to make demand more elastic and mitigate underutilization.
Of course, this is the primary cause of underproduction. There are,
however, other factors that can mitigate underproduction.
i.

The Degree of Exclusion

As stated above, the general theory behind underproduction is the
concept of public goods. However, unlike the pure public goods model,
software is not totally nonexcludable. The innovator can create the
product and only use it himself or he can limit distribution to only a
few users through private contract.
Other papers have developed the term "partial nonexcludability" to
describe software. 34 While the creator can try to limit distribution, at
some point direct control becomes limited. Someone with a strong
enough desire can appropriate an original and make a copy. Hence,
even without true nonexcludability, there is still a problem of
underproduction.
From the producer's viewpoint, the extent of underproduction is
dependent on the extent to which producers can exclude copiers from
-the market. For example, for specialized commercial software, the relatively small number of users may allow the producer to control the distribution of the *software. Since the producer is able to realize full
profit potential, there is less problem with underproduction. On the
other hand, for mass production software, the producer may not be able
to control copying. Hence, underproduction may be more acute.
Conversely, for users, a high degree of control by the producer
translates into increased monopoly control. The cost of underutilization
will therefore probably be higher for specialized software. On the other
hand, the easier access to mass production software mitigates the cost of
underutilization. The user will merely purchase a copy.
The producer can also attempt to limit copying by use of warranties
and technical support. Presumably, a producer will not replace or support an illegal copy. Hence, the need for service acts to mitigate
copying.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 39-42.

33. Unfortunately, this is also circular. This competition is dependent on the court's
grant of damages (a cost of copying) and the ability to enforce anti-copying laws (e.g., it
may be relatively easy to control copying of specialized software, but not for video games).
34. See, e.g., Novos & Waldman, supra note 20. Nordhaus refers to this as "partial
appropriability." See NORDHAUS, supra note 15, at 35-39.
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It should be noted that application software (e.g., wordprocessors,
spreadsheets, etc.) is generally not copy-protected and has a higher
price. One argument for this might be that the necessity of quality and
the desire for technical support are important factors in purchasing the
good. On the other hand, games are always copy-protected even though
they sell at a very low price. This suggests that quality and technical
support are not an integral part of the program. 35
If the producer is successful in excluding illegal users, then the cost
of underutilization becomes very high. However, the ability to contract
privately may also act as a mitigator. Several papers have offered a
Coasean analysis 86 of the underproduction/underutilization debate. If
the two parties, producer and consumer, have the ability to negotiate,
they will privately contract to minimize costs from underproduction
and underutilization. 37 The ability to negotiate (small transactions
costs) mitigates the need to protect the consumer. Therefore, it is
generally better to err in favor of the producer, unless the producer has
a high degree of control and there is no opportunity for direct
negotiation.8 6
ii.

The Cost of Copying

39
Unlike the pure public good model, copying may not be costless.
As opposed to the illumination from a street light, the "free rider" must
obtain access to an original and make a copy. High copying costs can
mitigate the loss from underproduction. If distribution is limited, copying may be costly. Conversely, if distribution is very wide, copying may
be inexpensive.
The pure public good model also does not reflect a difference in
quality. 4° While illumination from a street light may have no gradation
of quality, software and other recorded media can have a clear gradation in quality; e.g., bugs and/or problems in "unlocking" the original.
If the quality of the product is essential, consumers will opt for originals
and the loss from underproduction is mitigated.
Losses from underproduction may therefore not be as drastic as
with a pure public good. If copying costs are relatively high and the

35. This may also partially explain the amusing number of cases involving video
games.

36. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
37. See, e.g., Yu, Potential Competition and Contracting in Innovation, 24 J. L. &
ECON. 215 (1981).
38. This theory would predict that for limited distribution software, private contract
would be more prevalent. See generally id.
39. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 166-70.
40. See generally icL at 170-71.
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copy quality is relatively low, many consumers may opt to buy an original even if copying was legal. 4 1 If, on the other hand, copying costs are
low and the difference in quality is low, the cost of underproduction
42
will be high.

2.

Supply

If supply is fixed, the loss from underproduction is zero. Conversely, if supply is totally elastic, then the loss from underproduction is
infinite.
Some types of research are less sensitive to financial rewards than
others. There is a wide range of types of research, from the most fundamental of scientific experiments to the actual product offered to the
consumer. For simplicity, however, this paper divides research into two
groups: basic research and applied research. The difference is that basic research has no direct commercial impact. It either leads to applied
research or more basic research. In contrast, applied research leads to a
direct commercial benefit.
Basic research is not as sensitive to economic rewards (i.e., a patent
or copyright) as applied research. This is not to say that basic research
is totally insensitive to financial factors, but the direct value of selling
the innovation is not clear.4 Therefore, copyright protection is generally unnecessary.
There is another reason for not protecting basic research. With applied research, there are usually many different ways to accomplish the
intended goal. Substantially different products can do the same tasks.
However, with basic research, two researchers doing the same experiment, are bound to end up with similar results. Therefore, if the innovation is similar to basic research, there may be a production benefit
from copying-future innovators will be free to make the next advancement. Conversely, restricting access to basic research will unduly burden future advancements.
3.

Standardizationand the Network Paradox

The issue of standardization is similar to the copying problem discussed above. Copying can have positive effects. For example, if meth41. For example, the movie industry originally lobbied to restrict copying using VCR
tapes. They claimed that copying would eliminate their market. However, in hindsight,
home video has proven to be a huge market for the movie industry (but with a substantial
reduction in per unit price).
42. For example, DAT may differ from the previous VCR example in that a DAT
copy is "exactly" like the original. At least, the gradation in quality is theoretically less

with DAT than with VCR.
43. Financial incentives to create basic research tend to take a form other than intellectual property protection, i.e., grants.
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ods of operations are allowed to be copied, users will be able to learn
different software more quickly." Menell refers to this as a "network
'45
externality.
Networks are unique because they display a peculiar supply and demand. For example, consider the telephone system. A system with
only one user has very little value. At the other extreme, a telephone
system that can reach everyone is the most valuable; not only in the aggregate, but to each individual user as well. 46 As a result, we have a peculiar demand function which is upward sloping-the greater the
quantity sold, the greater the value to the user, and therefore the
higher the price the user is willing to pay.
On the supply side, large fixed costs and relatively small variable
costs create a relatively downward sloping supply curve (marginal cost
curve). Hence, supply and demand have the opposite characteristics as
47
normally expected and the optimal quantity at equilibrium is infinite.
Therefore, restricting the use of network standardizations will
lower welfare. If the innovation is a type of standardization (or basic
research), it is better to err in favor of the users.
VII.
A.

MEASURING SOCIAL VALUE FOR SOFTWARE
VALUE OF THE INNOVATION - MAGNITUDE ("M")

The key issue is the approximate value of the innovation.
Nordhaus refers to this value as the societal importance of the innovation,48 which is similar to the patent concept of a significant non-obvi49
ous step.
This paper divides magnitude into two separate components: (1) the
vertical leap, and (2) the horizontal leap.
1.

Vertical Leap ("V")

The vertical leap ("V") is defined as the extent to which an innovation improves upon the existing technology. The greater the V, the
greater the value created to society. Hence, an innovation with a large
44. For example, the icon driven interface of most Macintosh software, or using the
"F'" key for help.
45. Menell, supra note 15, at 1066-71.
46. This is a simplifying assumption. There may be at least one consumer who places
little value on being able to call anyone outside of a small group of people.
47. This is an enormous oversimplification. Eventually, marginal costs will rise and
marginal revenue (from each new phone) will begin to decline. However, it is important
to note this peculiar relationship.
48. See NoRDHAus, supra note 15.
49. This may also be similar to the copyright concept of originality. However, a technological step may imply a large degree of copying (i.e., building on others innovations).
Therefore, the patent concept is more useful.
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V should be widely protected whereas an innovation with a small V
merits narrower protection.
2. Horizontal Leap ("H")
The horizontal leap ("H") measures the extent to which an innovation has been created "ahead of its time." An innovation that would not
otherwise have been created for a substantial length of time would have
a high H. The larger the H, the broader the protection should be. H is
related to V, but it may not be the same. For example, if there are several firms attempting to discover the same innovation, then H may be
small irrespective of how large V may be. Alternatively, H may be very
large while V is relatively small if there is a profound but incremental
discovery.
Measuring H poses a difficult problem. However, courts have the
advantage of hindsight. The court is faced with an affirmative challenger and therefore has a benchmark on the size of H. The court's inquiry only needs to determine whether the challenger's discovery was
an independent process (and therefore a true measure of H) or whether
it was partially supported by the creator's original discovery, in which
case H is actually larger.
B.

MARKET FAcToRS - ELASTICITIES ("E")

As stated above, the relative elasticities of supply and demand are
important in that they help to determine whether it is better to err on
the side of the producer or the consumer. The following are several factors which may help a court to approximate the proper result.
1. Distribution("D'g
For simplicity, this paper will divide the potential products into
mass distribution and limited distribution.
Mass distribution software implies a greater likelihood of direct
competition. If the market is large enough for mass distribution, then
substitute competition is bound to follow. This lessens the problem of
underutilization. The opposite is true for limited distribution software.
In addition, the degree of exclusion and the cost of obtaining an
original for copying can be presumed to be lower with mass distribution
software. Therefore, the availability of copies results in a lower cost of
underutilization. Again, the opposite is true for limited distribution.
Also, even if the product has limited distribution, the loss from underutilization may be minimized by direct negotiation.
Therefore, if there is a high degree of control over distribution by
the producer and there is no ability to directly negotiate, it is better to
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err on the side of the consumer. In any other case, it is better to err on
the side of the producer.
2.

The Type of Software ("S")

If the product is the type of software which requires a high degree
of technical support or warranty protection, the control by the producer
is greater, and the conclusion is the same as limited distribution
software. The opposite is true for software that does not require warranties or technical support.
Likewise, if gradations in quality are an important consideration (as
they might be for the same type of software requiring technical support
and warranty protection), then greater control by the producer will
minimize the loss from underproduction (similar to limited distribution
software). If gradation in quality is not important, the opposite is true.
Therefore, if the software is the type of product that requires a
high degree of technical support or quality, it would be better to err on
the side of the consumer. Otherwise it would be better to err in favor
of the producer.
3.

Type of Innovation ("T")

As stated above, basic research is less sensitive to commercial rewards (such as copyright) than applied research. Since there is less loss
from underproduction, basic research should receive little copyright
protection.
Software packages are not easily defined as basic research. However, if we soften the characterizations, we can see that there may be
some programs that are more analogous to basic research than others.
Again, basic research is research that is the foundation for greater
research. Thus, if the software innovation can lead to newer and better
innovations (e.g., algorithms, programming languages, macros, etc.), the
protection should be more limited since a large loss would result from
underutilization. However, if the software is purely an end product
(e.g., video games), then a lower loss would result from underproduction, and the protection can be very strong.
There is a paradox with this concept. The same innovations we do
not want to protect because of T may be the very same research that
has a high V and H. However, T is assumed to be independent of V and
H. That is, T is the value created by future innovations, as opposed to
the value created by the current innovation. V and H are advances
above the related T value.
The concept of standardization also falls into this category. The
value of the standard is the ability for everyone to use it. Therefore,
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restricting the use of a standard reduces welfare. If the innovation can
be considered a standardization, then protection should be less.
C.
1.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Use

Use is not a true factor, but it is still important in determining the
social value of an innovation. Generally, the creator must use the product in order to receive protection. For example, a patent award has little social value if the inventor decides to shelve the discovery, and thus,
there is no compelling reason to protect the discovery. Also, the problem of copying is non-existent if the idea is not offered to the "pool of
knowledge."
Use is of less importance with software than with patents. Unlike
some patent inventions which occur by chance, software developments
never occur by chance. In order to receive a copyright, the software developer must have spent time and money writing the program. We can
presume that the producer wrote the program for an intended use and
not merely to shelve the innovation.
2. Costs Are Irrelevant
In direct contradiction with labor theory, the expenditures made on
research have no direct impact on the value created to society. For the
same reason that labor theory fails in determining the value of tangible
property, 5° labor theory fails to determine the value for intellectual
property.
Moreover, if the grant of rights is a primary incentive to expend research costs, granting rights based on expenditures creates a circularity
problem. In other words, a researcher allocates his research funds
based on the likelihood of receiving copyright protection. It would be
circular if, at the same time, the court were to grant protection based on
the amount of funds the researcher had allocated to this project.
3.

The True Market

In measuring the welfare loss from underproduction, it is important
to note that the producer loses only if the consumer would have otherwise purchased an original instead of a copy. 51 If this is not true, there
is no underproduction loss, since the sale would not have been made at
50. For example, the extent of labor expended on two identical widgets does not determine their price (value). Even if one widget took twice as long to make, it will not be
worth twice as much as its identical counterpart.
51. See Johnson, supra note 20, at 172.
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the higher monopoly price. On the other hand, there is a gain from
greater utilization from the copying.
VIII.

APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
A.

THE LEGAL DOCTRINE

To prove copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove (1) that
he possesses a valid copyright, and (2) the defendant copied the plaintiff's work.
1.

Valid Copyright - Copyrightability

Generally, the critical issue is not whether a copyright exists, but
whether the work is copyrightable. For a work to be copyrightable it
must be an "original work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
52
of expression."
Although early cases debated when a computer program is in a tangible medium, this is no longer the case. 5s The current debate has concentrated on the originality of the work. If the work is not original, it is
not copyrightable. Only works with at least some degree of originality
will be protected.
The courts have also struggled with a second issue. Section 102(b)
of the Copyright Act of 1976 states that ideas cannot be copyrighted;
only the expressions of those ideas can be protected. 54 Furthermore,
when the expression is inseparable from the idea, "protecting the expression in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the idea
upon the copyright owner.J'ss Therefore, the courts have ruled that this
type of expression is also not copyrightable.
The discussion by various courts on this rule is rather muddled.
The rule specifically states that an expression inseparable from its idea
cannot be found to be substantially similar, where substantial similarity
is a requirement to prove copying.ss However, the limitation on protecting ideas is not necessarily related to the issue of copying. 57 Even if
the work was undeniably copied, this rule states that the work is still
52. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
53. See, e.g., Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill.
1979); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
Much of the problem was eliminated by the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,
17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1980). See also, Note, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act A
New Weapon in the War Against Computer Software Piracy, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 417
(1986).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
55. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 63-67.
57. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. II. 1989) (The court
noted the ambiguous and inconsistent use of the term "substantial similarity").
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not protected. Therefore, an expression inseparable from its idea is not
copyrightable.
2.

Copying

Since proving copying is often difficult, the courts have created a
two-prong test to establish circumstantial evidence of copying. (a) ac58
cess and (b) substantial similarity.
a. Access
The implication of access is obvious. If the defendant had no access
to the plaintiff's program, there could be no copying. Since this is seldom the case, the question arises as to the degree of access. Presumably
the greater the degree of access, the greater the circumstantial evidence
59
of copying.
b.

SubstantialSimilarity

For two programs to be substantially similar, they must be "substantially similar in both ideas and expression. '' 6° To establish this, the
ninth circuit has developed another two-pronged test:
First, an 'extrinsic' test is used to determine whether two ideas are substantially similar. This is an objective test which rests upon specific criteria that can be listed and analyzed. Second, an 'intrinsic' test is used
to compare the forms of expression. This is a subjective test
which de61
pends on the response of the ordinary reasonable person.
The reason for this requirement is also straightforward. If the
works are completely dissimilar there is no copying regardless of the
degree of access.
B.

1.

THE LEGAL DOCTRINE V. THE MODEL

Originalityand Vertical Leap

As originality is the copyright equal to the patent "significant step,"
the concept of originality is analogous to vertical leap. The new work
must exhibit something new and unique above the existing level of
technology.
At first glance, the two concepts have at least one major difference.
Originality only goes to whether the work receives protection and is not
applicable to the breadth of protection. However, the courts have recog58. See, e.g. Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1988).
59. While this is a logical implication, the writer has not found any cases which explicitly make this statement.

60. E.g., Data E., 862 F.2d at 207; Frybarger v. I.B.M., 812 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1987).
61. Data E., 862 F.2d at 208; see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted).
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nized that the original aspects of a work will be protected, while aspects
which are not original will not be protected.62 In other words, the
greater the originality of various aspects of the work, the broader will
be the protection. This is not unlike the concept of vertical leap discussed above.
2. Inseparable Idea and Type of Innovation
In Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., Inc.63 the court explicitly states the
rational for the inseparable idea rule: "[i]f authors, by publishing their
works, could remove the ideas incorporated in them from the public domain, then they could stifle, rather than advance, the development and
'
exploitation of new ideas."6
Therefore, works which would prevent
other innovators from creating should not be protected (or at least receive less protection). This is analogous to the concept of basic
research. 6s
A related concept folded into the idea-expression argument is the
concept of standards. At least one court has used the idea-expression
argument to state that some "copying" may be socially desireable. 66 Restricting the use of "standards" defeats the value of the innovation.
Menell points out that the legal doctrine may be inadequate when
dealing with standards.6 7 For example, a new type of computer-human
interface may be expressed in many ways and therefore not qualify as
an expression inseparable from its idea. However, standardization requires exact duplication and copying would create value in this case.
Since the copying is "unnecessary," the legal doctrine will rule the use
of a standard as a copyright infringement without considering the positive externalities of the copying.
3.

Ideas and Magnitude

While the legal doctrine states that ideas cannot be copyrighted, the
model may award protection. More analogous to patent law, if the magnitude of the new idea is large enough, this gain may offset the burden
from the loss of access to the technology.
It is difficult to imagine a circumstance where the idea can be
62. See, e.g., DataE., 862 F.2d at 209.
63. 720 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
64. Id. at 1357.
65. Menell points out a possible shortcoming in the legal doctrine. If there is more
than one way to express the idea, but only one "optimal" way, the legal doctrine may
award more protection than is proper. Menell, supra note 15, at 1084.
66. Synercom Tech v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex.
1978). See also Menell, supra note 15, at 1093-1102 (Menell discusses the standardization
of human-computer interfaces).
67. Menell, supra note 15, at 1098-102.
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unique while the expression is not (and thus not otherwise protected),
or where the breakthrough idea would not be protected by patent. Regardless, should this occur, the current legal doctrine would not reward
the innovator even though it should.
4. Access and HorizontalLeap
Since access is generally uncontested, the concept of access is less
clear in the case law. To discuss this area, therefore, we will develop
our own case scenarios.
Scenario one: two innovators with the same idea independently author similar expressions. There was no specific cause for the similarity,
it was mere chance.
In this case, the legal doctrine would award no protection. There
was no access and thus no evidence of copying. Implicitly, the doctrine
states that if a second author could independently produce a substantially similar product, then the original warrants no protection.
The model would also deny protection. Any value created by the
first innovator (i.e., the horizontal leap), was already appropriated by
introducing the product first. If the time difference was very large, the
first innovator would already have received large monopoly profits. If
the time difference was small, then the first innovator only deserved
small returns.
Scenario two: same as above, except the second innovator had access to some aspects of the original.
At least one case implies protection only where access is proved. In
Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams. Inc.,ss the court distinguished between the types of access proved by the plaintiff. Having
concluded that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's computer
screens, the court allowed the action.69 However, having found no access to the code, the court ruled that there was no infringement of the
70
code.
As in scenario one, the model would also find that where the development is independent, there is no showing of damages. Conversely,
proof of access is circumstantial evidence that the horizontal leap would
have been larger had the defendant not had access. In other words, the
first innovator is due a larger monopoly return than he received. Moreover, the greater the access, the greater the difference between the
rightful monopoly return and the actual return received.
Scenario three: same as above, except the second innovator hears
68.

706 F. Supp. 984, 1000 (D. Conn. 1989).

69. Id. at 1000-02.
70. Id. at 1002.
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about the first innovator's idea, although the second innovator still independently develops the expression.
While the legal doctrine would not award any protection, the model
might. If the second innovator would not have been able to create his
own work, absent the appropriated knowledge from the first innovator,
then some protection may be merited. This unlikely scenario is the
same as the unique idea (but not expression) problem discussed above.
5. Access and Distribution
While these two principles are different, there is a clear overlap.
For example, access to copies or originals is presumably greater for
mass distribution software than for limited distribution software. Unfortunately, since the courts have failed to discuss access in much detail,
it is impossible to detect whether this type of logic exists in the courts'
minds.
There is also an aspect of distribution missing from the concept of
access: the aspect of competition. This exposes a large difference between the legal doctrine and the developed model-the legal doctrine
does not consider the welfare of non-innovator consumers.
The model was developed to maximize societal welfare. It considers whether the gain to producers outweighs the loss to consumers
(hence, the existence of competition is an important consideration since
it affects consumers' choices). The legal doctrine has no such normative
goal. Instead, following a literal reading of the Constitution, it seeks to
maximize innovation. Therefore, the lack of alternative products for
the consumer is irrelevant. The logical conclusion of the legal doctrine
is that any innovation that does not inhibit future innovation should receive the broadest protection possible. This principle is clearly erroneous, although the cost of this view is clearer with other types of
innovations (e.g., pharmaceuticals).
Maximizing innovation is a myopic goal. By creating incentives for
innovation, we are actually creating incentives to create value. As
stated above, it is counterproductive to destroy this value with overzealous protection.
6. Substantial Similarity
The principle of substantial similarity has no corollary in the developed model. The reason is that this principle has a circularity problem.
The legal doctrine indicates that infringement is dependent on whether
similarity exists. However, the question the court is addressing is how
similar the defendant's product can be before it infringes the plaintiff's
copyright (i.e., the breadth of protection).
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7. Type of Software
Section VI labeled copying as a type of competition. Since the type
of software issue is related to the feasibility of copying, it is really related to the existence of competition. As above, the legal doctrine has
totally ignored this aspect, as it has ignored the issue from the perspective of the consumer.
In addition, this factor reveals another shortcoming of the legal
doctrine. It fails to distinguish traditional copyrightable works (i.e., art
and literature) from technological works. For example, the value of a
work of art is generally in its viewing, and this type of enjoyment is not
specific to the work. In contrast, a computer program may be used for
further productive purposes and may be the only program which performs the particular task. Other works, such as artwork, will exhibit a
high degree of substitutability (i.e., a high degree of competition), while
a computer program may not. Further, hindering the use of software
may hinder other (non-innovative) productive activities, while this is
generally not the case with art.
As discussed above, a product which is easily substitutable (by
either other products or copying), like a video game, has less problem
with underutilization. However, a program which is not as substitutable, like a specialized program, has a high problem with underutilization. This is a distinction which is not ordinarily faced with traditional
works.
8. Damages
Since this section deals with the optimality of a statute, this section
is not the primary focus of this paper. However, an improper award of
damages has the same effect as underprotection or overprotection.
Damages therefore deserve some discussion.
The Copyright Act of 1976 states that the plaintiff can recover his
actual damages plus the defendant's profits. 71 However, the defendant's
profits are only recoverable if they are not a part of the actual
72
damages.
73
Commentators seem to be confused on the meaning of this law.
While unclear with other works, the meaning is clear with marketable
software. Generally, the plaintiff's actual damages will be lost sales
(plus consequential damages). Presumably, these sales were lost to the
defendant. Since this translates into profits for the defendant, the lost
sales of the plaintiff can overlap the profits of the defendant.
What if the defendant's sales are larger than sales lost by the plain71. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1990).
72. Id.
73. See NuaimM

ON COPYRIGHT § 14.01 (1963 & Supp. 1990).
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tiff? In other words, an issue arises when the defendant made some
sales that the plaintiff would never have received. 74 Should these incremental sales be discouraged? 75 The statute discourages this activity
even though the use is increased without diminishing the producer's incentive (i.e., the producer loses nothing). Therefore, the question is
how can we allow the incremental sales without diminishing the innovator's incentive (e.g., by losing sales to the challenger).
If the court places an injunction on all of the defendant's sales, will
the plaintiff ignore the incremental potential sales (assuming that for
whatever reason this plaintiff is unable to exploit these sales)? Generally not. The optimal solution is for the plaintiff to grant a license to
the defendant for those incremental sales. Therefore, the value of a li76
cense may be the appropriate value for damages.
C.

CONCLUSIONS ON APPLICATION OF THE MODEL

There is an inherent difficulty in dealing with court cases. This
Note has chosen a broad scope. A court's scope is limited to the plaintiff and the defendant. Society is not a party, and therefore it may be
unfair to expect judges to adjudicate cases on behalf of society.
Nonetheless, on the whole, legal rules are generally expected to
help the court reach a normative end. With some minor adjustments,
the legal doctrine does fairly well in maximizing innovation. The one
difference is that many of the principles of the legal doctrine are implicit while the principles of the developed model are explicit.
The legal doctrine, however, completely misses the target when
maximizing innovation does not maximize social welfare. It completely
ignores the principle that the value of an innovation (or any product) is
in its use. While this underutilization problem is less significant with
traditional works, it can be very significant for technological works.
IX.

INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS

A major factor which has not been developed in the preceding
model is the problem of international competition. The preceding
model has implicitly assumed that the United States federal government has sole control over computer copyright. This is a fair assumption for domestic cases but is obviously false for international cases.
The impact of technology ownership on national economies, and
74. See discussion on "true Market" aupra text accompanying note 51.
75. Punishment (i.e., punitive damages) is only appropriate when deterrence is the
goal; when wilful misconduct is evident.
76. This example is limited to where direct negotiation is possible. In this instance,
the court is actually deciding which party will have the upper hand in negotiations rather
than making a final adjudication.
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the resulting welfare effect, has not been discussed. But if we presume
that the impact is not zero, it is apparent that this is an area worthy of
study.
This international dimension was made more acute when the
United States joined the Berne Convention. Under the Berne Convention, in principle, creators have automatic copyright protection for
works that have a valid copyright in the home country (after registration) in any Berne Convention member country. Thus, court decisions
not only have a national impact, but an international impact as well.
X.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court has stated the normative theory
of intellectual property: "The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
in 'Science and useful Arts.' "77
The Supreme Court has therefore acknowledged that economics is
the normative basis for intellectual property. Further, the Court has
stated that the welfare of the public, as opposed to the welfare of artists
and inventors, is the normative goal.
Unfortunately, the common law rules presented by various courts
are framed in the rhetoric of traditional theories. Not unexpectedly,
the framing of economic normative goals in traditional rhetoric has lead
to ambiguous and confusing language.
This Note has presented an economic rational for copyright and has
presented it in economic rhetoric. This is an attempt to present an alternative to the concepts now used. The model and theory developed in
this Note are less ambiguous and more flexible to meet the needs of a
rapidly changing environment.
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